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Abstract	
	The	physics	of	matter	 in	the	condensed	state	 is	concerned	with	problems	in	which	the	number	of	constituent	particles	 is	vastly	greater	than	can	be	easily	comprehended.		The	inherent	physical	limitations	of	the	human	mind	are	fundamental	and	restrict	the	way	in	which	we	can	interact	with	and	learn	about	the	universe.		This	 presents	 challenges	 for	 developing	 scientific	 explanations	that	 are	 met	 by	 emergent	 narratives,	 concepts	 and	 arguments	that	 have	 a	 non-trivial	 relationship	 to	 the	 underlying	microphysics.	By	examining	examples	within	condensed	matter	physics,	 and	 also	 from	 cellular	 automata,	 I	 show	 how	 such	emergent	narratives	efficiently	describe	elements	of	reality.					
	
1.	Introduction		The	subject	of	emergence	has	become	of	interest	to	philosophers	(see	O’	Connor	and	Wong,	2015),	and	much	has	been	written	in	aid	of	teasing	out	different	types	of	emergent	behaviour.		A	distinction	is	often	made	between	`weak’	and	`strong’	emergence,	 sometimes	 called	 `epistemological’	 or	 `ontological’	 emergence	respectively,	although	different	authors	define	these	terms	in	slightly	contrasting	ways.		Essentially,	the	distinction	is	between	an	emergence	that	is	constructed	in	terms	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 human	 knowledge	 and	 one	 that	 is	 fundamentally	irreducible,	 representing	a	new	element	of	 reality.	 	For	example,	 in	 the	weakly	emergent	case,	a	macroscopic	state	can	still	be	determined	from	the	microscopic	physics,	but	viably	only	through	computer	simulations	that	can	crunch	through	repeated	 iteration	 of	 the	 low-level	 laws	 (Bedau,	 1997).	 	 Thus	 it	might	 be	 only	difficult	 and	 cumbersome	 to	 go	 from	 the	 lower	 level	 explanation	 (the	microscopic	 world)	 to	 the	 upper	 level	 (the	 macroscopic	 world),	 but	 not	completely	 impossible.	 	 In	 the	 strongly	 emergent	 case	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	higher	level	is	fundamentally	irreducible	to	the	lower	level	(Kim	1999),	and	new	‘causal	powers’	are	 invoked	which	act	 ‘downward’.	Some	philosophers	seem	to	feel	 that	 the	 strong	 version	 is	where	 the	 real	 philosophical	meat	 is.	 	 Thus	 it	 is	thought	 to	 be	 “the	 most	 interesting	 and	 important	 kind	 of	 emergence”	(Silbertstein	and	McGeever	1999).		Of	course,	such	a	`strong	emergent’	approach	appears	to	best	target	their	holy-grail	problem,	namely	the	determination	of	the	nature	 of	 the	 conscious	 mind,	 which	 some	 wish	 to	 be	 wholly	 irreducible	 to	physiological	neural	states	(O’Connor	and	Wong	2005).		Thus	if	I	decide	to	act	in	the	 world,	 perhaps	 making	 up	 my	 mind	 to	 switch	 on	 an	 electric	 kettle,	 my	
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strongly	 emergent	 consciousness	 (higher	 level)	 is	 imagined	 to	 downwardly	cause	a	resultant	state	of	(lower	level)	molecular	motion	in	the	heated	water.				Strong	 emergence	 has	 however	 been	 described	 as	 “uncomfortably	 like	magic’’	(Bedau,	 1997)	 and	 most	 scientists	 have	 an	 instinctive	 aversion	 to	 it.	 	 Why	shouldn’t	 it	be	possible,	 in	principle,	even	if	not	feasible	in	practice,	to	describe	the	entire	process	of	me	deciding	to	switch	on	a	kettle	and	the	resultant	jiggling	of	 H2O	molecules	 all	 at	 the	micro-level	 (neural	 and	molecular	 processes)	 in	 a	seamless	whole?	 	 Scientists	 are	 perhaps	 expected	 to	 express	 such	 reductionist	sentiments	that	would	then	predispose	them	against	emergence,	so	the	current	popularity	 of	 the	 topic	 amongst	 physicists	 might	 be	 surprising.	 	 The	 word	‘emergence’	now	frequently	appears	in	the	titles	of	research	papers	in	condensed	matter	physics	 (in	 the	 last	decade	 “emergence”	or	 “emergent”	has	 appeared	 in	the	 title	 of	well	 over	 a	 hundred	 papers	 in	 the	 journal	Physical	Review	Letters).		Some	 of	 the	most	 vocal	 advocates	 of	 emergence	 have	 been	 condensed	matter	physicists	 (Anderson	 1972,	 Laughlin	 and	 Pines	 2000,	 Laughlin	 2005).	 	 The	Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 defines	 emergence	 as	 the	 “process	 of	 coming	 forth,	issuing	 from	concealment”,	 and	 this	 appearance	or	manifestation	of	 something	that	was	previously	buried	or	hidden	from	view	captures	the	sense	of	the	word	as	 used	 by	 physicists.	 	 Emergent	 properties	 are	 somehow	 inherent	 in	 the	underlying	microscopics,	 but	 not	 in	 any	 obvious	 or	 easily	 extractable	manner,	and	 their	 appearance	 is	 wonderful,	 surprising	 and	 pointing	 to	 higher-level	organizing	 principles	 that	 operate	 at	 a	 new	 level.	 	 But	 are	 these	 higher-level	organizing	principles	simply	weak	emergence?				Some	string	 theorists	 in	 fact	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	emergent	principles	 represent	new	physics	at	all,	even	though	they	might	be	important	for	practical	purposes.		Brian	Greene	states	that	although	“it	would	be	hard	to	explain	the	properties	of	a	tornado	in	terms	of	the	physics	of	electrons	and	quarks,	I	see	this	as	a	matter	of	calculational	 impasse,	 not	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 need	 for	 new	physical	 laws.	 	But	again,	 there	 are	 some	 who	 disagree	 with	 this	 view.”	 (Greene	 2000)	 	 So	 are	emergent	 laws	 new	 or	 do	 they	 simply	 represent	 what	 Greene	 calls	 a	“calculational	impasse”?		The	 idea	 that	 I	will	develop	 in	 this	paper	 is	 that	emergent	 laws	and	properties	are	independent,	novel	structures	that	function	effectively	because	they	are	well	adapted	for	human	thought	processes.	I	discern	that	there	is	a	powerful	analogy	between	 doing	 science	 and	 storytelling.	 	 To	work,	 stories	 have	 to	 be	 succinct,	told	well,	have	a	point	and	express	some	truth.		This	is	simply	because	they	are	transmitted	 and	 received	 by	 human	 minds	 which	 have	 certain	 physical	limitations.	 	 These	 limitations	 become	 crucial	 when	 faced	 with	 any	 physical	problem	 involving	 complexity,	 be	 that	 a	 story	 of	 human	 interactions	 (such	 as	
Middlemarch)	or	a	 story	of	electronic	 interactions	 (such	as	 the	Mott	 insulator).	Emergent	 properties	 nevertheless	 have	 both	 an	 ontological	 and	 an	epistemological	 character.	 	 To	 develop	 this	 thesis	 I	 will	 begin	 in	 Section	 2	 by	considering	some	lessons	that	can	be	extracted	from	Conway’s	game	of	Life	and	the	insights	that	it	gives	on	the	nature	of	causation	and	the	nature	of	what	I	call	emergent	 narratives.	 	 In	 Section	 3,	 I	 will	 develop	 the	 idea	 that	 emergent	narratives	are	effective	because	of	the	physical	 limitations	that	apply	to	human	
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minds	and	will	describe	these	 limitations	by	analogy	with	Landauer’s	notion	of	the	physicality	 of	 information.	 	 In	 Section	4,	 I	will	 give	 examples	 of	 how	 these	emergent	 narratives	 can	 be	 successful	 in	 scientific	 descriptions	 of	 systems	 in	condensed	matter	physics.		
2.	Life	Lessons		John	 Horton	 Conway’s	 game	 of	 Life	 is	 a	 favourite	 example	 of	 a	 simple	mathematical	 system	 (a	 cellular	 automaton)	 that	 illustrates	 surprising	 and	unexpected	 complex	 behaviour	 and	 was	 introduced	 as	 a	 toy	 model	 for	understanding	the	appearance	of	biological	organisms.		It	is	still	a	useful	starting	point	 for	 describing	 emergent	 properties.	 The	 principles	 of	 the	 game	 of	 Life	(Gardner	1970,	Poundstone	1985,	Adamatsky	2010)	are	simply	stated:		A	square	grid	of	 cells	 (like	a	 checkerboard)	 is	defined	and	each	of	 its	 cells	 can	be	either	alive	 or	 dead	 (and	 usually	 coloured	 black	 or	 white	 respectively).	 	 Time	 is	discretized	 and	 a	 new	 configuration	 is	 obtained	 at	 each	 time-step	 that	 is	determined	only	by	the	configuration	during	the	previous	time	step,	and	worked	out	according	to	the	following	four	rules.	1. Any	 live	 cell	 with	 fewer	 than	 two	 live	 neighbours	 dies,	 as	 if	 caused	 by	under-population.	2. Any	 live	 cell	 with	 two	 or	 three	 live	 neighbours	 lives	 on	 to	 the	 next	generation.	3. Any	 live	 cell	 with	 more	 than	 three	 live	 neighbours	 dies,	 as	 if	 by	overcrowding.	4. Any	dead	cell	with	exactly	three	live	neighbours	becomes	a	live	cell,	as	if	by	reproduction.	These	 simple	 rules	 are	 all	 there	 is,	 and	 so	 we	 have	 stated	 the	 `theory	 of	everything’	 for	 the	 Life	 universe	 (just	 in	 fact	 as	 we	 do	 in	 condensed	 matter	physics,	 where	 the	 theory	 of	 everything	 is	 the	 many-particle	 Schrödinger	equation,	 see	 Laughlin	 and	 Pines	 (2000)).	 Thus	 Life	 is	 ideal	 for	 discussing	emergence	 (Bedau,	1997).	 	Of	course,	 the	game	of	Life	has	clear	 limitations	 for	describing	`our’	world:	it’s	only	two-dimensional,	the	state	space	is	1	or	0,	space	is	quantized,	 evolution	 is	 irreversible	 (the	arrow	of	 time	 is	hard-wired	 in)	 and	it’s	completely	deterministic.		Nevertheless,	as	we	shall	see	it	is	highly	illustrative	of	many	features	of	the	real	world.		The	 game	 of	Life	 provides	 a	 privileged	 standpoint,	 just	 as	 imagined	 for	 an	 all-seeing	Laplacian	demon	(of	which	more	later).	One	is	able	to	observe	the	entire	
Life	universe,	staked	out	on	its	grid,	and	follow	its	evolution	in	minute	detail	as	time	iterates	 forward.	 	A	physicist	would	naturally	 look	for	stable	structures	 in	the	game	of	Life,	 and	 in	 fact	one	quickly	 finds	 that	 there	are	several	 (these	are	known	 as	 `still	 lifes’).	 	 But	 then	 you	 encounter	 `oscillators’,	 strange	 forms	 that	loop	 periodically	 through	 a	 sequence	 of	 configurations,	 some	 simple	 (the	`blinker’	is	a	period	2	oscillator	consisting	of	three	squares	in	a	line),	some	highly	complex	(the	 `queen	bee	shuttle’	 is	a	period	30	oscillator	and	some	are	known	with	periods	of	 several	hundred).	 	These	 `life	 forms’	are	all	 rooted	 to	 the	 spot,	but	 there	 are	 also	 `spaceships’,	 configurations	 that	 propagate	 across	 the	 grid.		
Life	 has	 a	 natural	 speed	 limit	 since	 the	 rules	 dictate	 that	 each	 cell	 can	 only	influence	its	direct	nearest	neighbours,	so	that	the	effective	speed	of	light,	c,	(the	
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speed	 at	which	 some	 effect	 can	 propagate)	 is	 one	 cell	 per	 generation	 (though	because	 of	 Life’s	 nearest-neighbour	 rule,	 this	 can	 be	 either	 along	 the	horizontal/vertical	 axes	 or	 diagonally	 between	 them	 and	 so	 is	 rather	anisotropic).	 	A	spaceship	must	retain	its	shape	while	propagating,	and	Conway	showed	that	 this	means	 that	spaceships	can	travel	horizontally	or	vertically	no	faster	 than	 c/2	 (spaceships	 are	 known	 that	 travel	 at	 c/2,	 c/3,	 c/4,	 17c/45,	31c/240	and	many	other	values,	but	c/2	is	the	upper	limit).		Diagonal	transport	is	also	possible;	an	example	is	shown	in	Figure	1(a)	and	looks	more	like	a	flying	bird	 than	 a	 spaceship	 and	 accordingly	 is	 known	 as	 a	 `Canada	 goose’.	 	 It	 flies	diagonally	 (Figure	 1(b)),	 at	 a	 speed	 of	 c/4	 (after	 four	 generations	 it	will	 have	advanced	 one	 cell	 horizontally	 and	 one	 cell	 vertically)	 and	 if	 you	 watch	 an	animation	of	its	movement	it	rather	resembles	a	bird	in	flight,	gently	flapping	its	wings.		Its	detailed	structure	is	quite	critical	to	its	operation.		Removing	a	single	pixel	from	the	initial	configuration	(Figure	1(c))	results	in	the	bird	exploding	in	what	 looks	 like	a	 fireball	only	shortly	after	 takeoff	 (Figure	1(d)).	As	with	some	mutations	of	DNA,	or	tiny	chemical	changes	on	a	small	molecule,	the	effects	of	a	minor	alteration	can	have	dramatic	consequences.			(In	the	Life	world	the	forms	exhibit	much	greater	fragility	than	those	in	the	physical	world.	In	our	world,	the	higher	spatial	dimension,	the	greater	complexity	of	the	underlying	laws	and	the	rigidity	 arising	 from	 broken	 symmetry	 states	 all	 contribute	 to	 a	 more	 robust	stability	against	perturbations.)		Although	the	simplest	structures	in	Life	can	be	derived	using	pen	and	paper	(as	Conway	himself	did),	more	complex	structures	require	a	computer	to	mindlessly,	but	accurately,	 iterate	the	rules.	 	 In	one	sense,	Life	 is	simply	a	grid	of	ones	and	zeros	 twinkling	 in	 and	 out	 of	 existence	 in	 the	 unthinking	 service	 of	 an	unrelenting	algorithm.		So	is	the	Canada	goose	real?		Or	is	this	just	a	pattern	I	see,	telling	 you	more	 about	my	 brain	 than	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 `reality’?	 	 Since	 the	Canada	goose	is	a	well-defined	structure	in	Life,	with	measurable	properties	such	as	 shape,	 speed	 and	direction	 of	 travel,	 it	 is	 as	 real	 as	 any	 of	 the	 pixels	 out	 of	which	 it	 is	 composed	 (see	 Dennett	 1991).	 	 In	 the	 physical	world,	we	 describe	particles	as	excitations	 in	a	quantum	 field.	 	That	 field	pervades	all	 space,	but	a	particle	 `exists’	 when	 that	 field	 is	 promoted	 out	 of	 the	 vacuum	 state	 at	 some	position	 in	space	 (see	e.g.	Lancaster	and	Blundell	2014).	 	The	particle	has	well	defined	properties	such	as	mass	and	charge	(and,	 for	the	photon,	a	 fixed	speed	and	direction	of	travel,	just	like	the	Canada	goose).		So	these	structures	are	real,	but	 have	 to	 be	 perceived	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 description	 from	 that	 of	 the	individual	particles,	and	this	is	what	emergence	is	all	about.		More	 complex	 structures	 are	 still	 being	 discovered	 in	 Life	 (see	www.conwaylife.com/wiki	for	more	details)	and	are	found	using	the	intelligence	of	real	people,	creatively	using	meta-rules	about	important	Life	processes	that	go	beyond	the	basic	rules.				To	give	an	example,	in	language	that	I	have	designed	to	look	like	physics,	consider	the	collision	of	two	horizontally	travelling	spaceships	(Figure	 2);	 as	 is	 common	 in	 physics,	 one	 tries	 to	 understand	 systems	 by	smashing	 them	 into	 each	 other.	 	 The	 results	 reveal	 a	 plethora	 of	 interesting	phenomena,	 but	 I	 have	 chosen	 just	 three	 examples.	 By	 varying	 the	 initial	positions	 (and	 in	 the	 final	case	using	a	slightly	 longer	spaceship)	 the	results	of	the	collision	are	seen	to	be	quite	different,	leading	to	the	creation	of	two	`gliders’	
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travelling	diagonally	(Figure	2(a,b)),	total	annihilation	(Figure	2(d,e))	or	creation	of	a	`pulsar’,	a	visually	attractive	period	3	oscillator	(Figure	2(g,h)).		It	is	easy	to	describe	the	`before’	and	`after’	of	each	collision,	but	the	process	of	the	collision	itself	 is	 quite	 complicated,	 so	 I	 have	 written	 down	 a	 kind	 of	 Feynman-like	diagram	to	conceptualize	the	interaction	(Figure	2(c,f,i)	show	diagrams	for	these	three	processes).		These	diagrams	are	clearly	much	easier	to	comprehend,	and	it	is	this	kind	of	modular	insight	(which	one	could	call	an	‘interacting	field	theory	of	
Life	structures’),	focussing	on	the	function	of	larger	structures,	that	has	led	to	the	construction	of	 logic	gates,	 information	processors	and	Turing	machines	within	the	game	of	Life	(Rendell	2002,	Rennard	2002).		Note	 that	 the	 causal	 flow	 in	 both	 levels,	 lower	 (individual	 pixels)	 and	 upper	(Canada	geese),	are	independent	and	you	can	use	either	(see	Figure	3).		It	might	be	 convenient	 to	 stick	 to	 the	 upper	 level	when	 things	 are	 simple	 and	 regular,	such	as	spaceships	flying	through	the	air	in	straight	lines,	but	then	dive	down	to	the	 lower	 level	 to	 compute	 the	 collision	 process,	 and	 then	 rise	 back	 up	 to	 the	upper	 level	 afterwards.	 	 This	 probably	 provides	 the	 cleanest	 explanatory	account,	but	note	that	the	swapping	between	levels	is	simply	your	choice	and	so	the	apparent	top-down	or	bottom-up	causation	in	those	vertical	jumps	in	Figure	3	merely	trace	out	the	causal	path	you	have	selected.		It	is	entirely	legitimate	to	fix	your	whole	attention	either	on	the	lower	level	(as	the	computer	does)	or	on	the	 upper	 level	 (invoking	 a	 Feynman-like	 procedure	 to	 handle	 the	 collision	process).		The	switching	between	levels	depends	on	how	you	want	to	think	about	the	physical	processes	and	is	therefore	purely	epistemological.	 	(In	this,	I	share	Butterfield's	 unease	 (Butterfield,	 2011)	unease	 about	many	discussions	of	 top-down	causation	that	reify	one	particular	direction	of	causal	flow.)	Nevertheless,	there	 is	 an	 ontological	 dimension	 to	 the	 levels	 themselves.	 	 The	 ‘real	 patterns’	(Dennett	1991)	at	the	higher	level	deserve	ontic	status	every	bit	as	much	as	do	the	 flickering	pixels	at	 the	 lower	 level.	 	Both	 levels	are	valid	descriptors	of	 the	`reality’	of	properties	within	the	Life	universe,	but	just	as	we	find	in	the	physical	universe,	 certain	 levels	 are	 better	 suited	 to	 brute	 computation,	 others	 to	 the	construction	of	narratives	comprehensible	to	the	human	mind.				Even	 though	 the	 `theory	 of	 everything’	 is	 known,	 we	 have	 found	 that	 new	structures	 and	 new	 `laws’	 emerge	 non-trivially	 and	 unexpectedly.	 It	 is	 often	stated	 that	 the	 game	 of	 Life	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 `weak	 emergence’,	 weak	because	unlike	the	case	of	`strong	emergence’	you	can	(it	seems)	always	compute	everything	at	the	lower	level.	 	Thus	reductionism	works,	and	you	don’t	need	to	work	 at	 the	 higher,	 emergent	 level	 if	 you	 don’t	 want	 to.	 	 Of	 course,	 Life	 is	 an	example	where	you	can	sit	back	and	let	the	computer	take	the	strain	and	work	everything	 out.	 	 But	 the	 computer	 doesn’t	 pull	 the	 patterns	 out	 for	 you	 as	 it	computes	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 flickering	pixels;	 it	needs	you,	 the	observer,	 to	 see	the	 Canada	 geese.	 	 And	 the	 computer	 only	 simulates	 the	 microscopic	 world	because	 the	 grid	 we	 choose	 is	 usually	 very	 small;	 for	 the	 game	 of	 Life	implemented	 on	 a	 grid	 of	 size	 1012	 pixels	 by	 1012	 pixels	 then	 one	 single	configuration	would	exceed	the	total	storage	capacity	of	all	computers	currently	on	Earth	(and	if	this	paper	is	being	read	in	the	far	future,	increase	the	dimension	of	 the	 grid	 by	 a	 few	 powers	 of	 ten	 until	 my	 argument	 holds).	 	 Thus	 we	 can’t	simulate	on	these	scales.	Nevertheless,	with	only	a	modicum	of	thought,	you	can	
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work	out	how	many	time	steps	it	would	take	for	a	Canada	goose	to	fly	from	one	corner	to	the	other	using	an	emergent	meta–law	(Answer:	4	x	1012).			The	 game	 of	 Life	 is	 often	 dismissed	 as	 just	 weak	 emergence	 since,	 without	anything	complicated	happening,	the	simple	rules	allow	the	automata	to	iterate	along	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 is	 calculable	 (but	 only,	 I	 stress,	 for	 relatively	 small	systems).		But	the	`biologists’	of	Life	have	spent	decades	studying	the	taxonomy	of	 these	 ‘Life-forms’	 and	 the	major	 discoveries	 that	 have	 been	made	 required	radically	emergent	thinking	and	a	deep	and	profound	“knowing”	of	the	problem	that	goes	way	beyond	mere	simulation.		Thus	the	power	of	these	emergent	laws	should	not	be	underestimated	 (it	 is	not	 simply,	 in	Greene’s	phrase,	a	matter	of	“computational	impasse”).		With	a	Turing	machine	constructed	within	the	game	of	Life,	it	is	possible	to	construct	an	initial	condition	for	which	the	final	result	is	genuinely	undecidable	(Moore	1990,	Bennett	1990,	Wolfram	1985)	so	that	even	this	simple	`game’	belies	the	presence	of	extraordinarily	subtle	behaviour.		A	 more	 complex	 example	 is	 that	 of	 number	 theory.	 The	 ‘universe’	 of	 number	theory	is	the	set	of	integers,	equipped	with	the	basic	‘low-level’	rules	of	addition	and	subtraction.	 	Yet	the	richness	of	the	structure,	patterns	and	forms	latent	 in	this	apparently	bland	arithmetic	structure	have	for	centuries	dazzled	and	baffled	some	of	the	finest	mathematical	minds.		The	emergent	laws	are,	as	in	the	game	of	
Life,	 reducible	 to	 the	 basic	 rules	 of	 the	 system,	 but	 once	 again	 the	 way	 they	emerge	 is	 highly	 non-trivial	 and	 requires	 the	 development	 of	 new	 emergent	concepts.	 	 There	 is	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 between	 being	 able	 to	 calculate	within	a	system	and	knowing	it	at	a	deeper	(higher)	level.		As	Wigner	has	put	it,	mathematics	 “would	 soon	 run	 out	 of	 interesting	 theorems	 if	 these	 had	 to	 be	formulated	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 concepts	 which	 already	 appear	 in	 the	 axioms”	(Wigner	1960).		
Life	 and	 number	 theory	 are	 simply	 defined	 arenas	 in	 which	 rich	 emergent	behaviour	 nevertheless	 unfolds.	 	 The	 physical	world	 is	 equipped	with	 an	 even	more	complex	mixture	of	competing	interactions	and	varieties	of	particles	even	at	the	lower	microscopic	level,	so	that	one	can	expect	the	emergent	higher	level	properties	 to	be	even	more	startling	and	abundant.	 	 I	note	 that	Silberstein	and	McGeever	 in	 their	 characterization	 of	 different	 types	 of	 emergence	 focus	 on	entanglement	 of	 identical	 quantum	 particles	 as	 a	 good	 example	 of	 ontological	emergence.		Entanglement	demonstrates	a	failure	of	whole-part	reductionism,	so	that	an	entangled	pair	"gives	us	good	reason	to	doubt	the	atomistic	vision	of	the	world"	 in	 which	 "fundamental	 particles	 carry	 for	 ever	 fixed	 properties	independently	of	their	contextual	features"	(Silberstein	and	McGeever,	1999).		Of	course,	the	quantum	mechanics	of	an	entirely	empty	Universe	containing	a	single	particle	 is	 a	 barren,	 sparse,	 scrawny	 theory.	 Quantum	 mechanics	 demands	 a	more	abundant	and	lush	landscape	to	display	its	richness,	and	an	entirely	empty	Universe	 containing	 two	 particles	 is	 the	 absolute	 minimum	 requirement!	 But	their	 emphasis	on	 contextual	 features	 correctly	highlights	 the	potential	 for	 the	relationship	 between	 entities	 to	 generate	 new	 features	 of	 reality.	 	These	 new	emergent	 features,	 such	 as	 quantum	 entanglement,	 fully	 deserve	 their	 ontic	status,	but	I	will	argue	that	this	is	in	common	with	most,	if	not	all,	such	emergent	features.			
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3.	The	limits	to	knowing		What	does	 it	mean	for	us	to	get	our	head	around	a	physical	system?	 	 In	a	 two-body	 problem,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 our	minds	 to	 keep	 track	 of	 the	 positions	 and	momenta	 of	 the	 two	 bodies,	 though	 we	 frequently	 work	 in	 a	 reference	 frame	where	we	keep	one	of	the	two	fixed	(we	speak	of	the	Earth	going	round	the	Sun	more	often	than	the	two	orbiting	their	centre	of	mass).		By	keeping	track	of	these	variables,	I	can	make	a	one-to-one	correspondence	between	the	value	taken	by	a	physical	variable	at	a	particular	time	and	a	number	which	is	stored	in	my	brain,	or	written	on	a	piece	of	paper,	or	stored	in	a	computer	(if	I	wish	to	let	a	machine	take	 the	 strain).	 	With	 the	values	 taken	by	 those	variables	 I	 can	predict	 future	behaviour	 or	 retrodict	 past	 behaviour	 using	 relatively	 simple	 analytical	formulae.	The	three-body	problem	is	vastly	more	complicated	and	resists	simple	analytic	 description	 in	most	 cases,	 but	 the	 physics	 of	matter	 in	 the	 condensed	state	 frequently	 involves	 a	 1023-body	 problem.	 	 In	 this	 case,	 qualitatively	 new	behaviour	emerges;	 the	existence	of	more	bodies	 is	not	 just	a	simple	change	of	scale	but	in	Anderson’s	memorable	phrase	``more	is	different’’	(Anderson,	1972).		1023	vastly	exceeds	the	number	of	things	a	human	can	conveniently	think	about	(we	each	have	 fewer	 than	1012	neurons	and	1015	 synapses,	but	most	of	us	 can	only	focus	on	a	half-dozen	objects	at	one	time).	Moreover	in	these	problems	we	frequently	need	to	 think	about	combinatorial	numbers	such	as	1023!,	a	number	that	 is	 larger	 than	ten	to	 the	power	of	1024.	 	Such	a	number	vastly	exceeds	 the	number	 of	 particles	 in	 the	 observable	 universe,	 and	 thus	 there	 is	 insufficient	physical	computing	resource	to	calculate	in	a	one-to-one	sense.			The	 revolution	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 information	 science	 is	 neatly	encapsulated	in	Rolf	Landauer’s	aphorism:		“Information	is	physical”	(Landauer	1961,	 Bennett	 2003).	 	 Computer	 science	 had	 been	 thought	 to	 operate	 in	 an	entirely	separate	domain	from	the	physical	world,	an	abstract	space	of	ones	and	zeros	interacting	via	chains	of	logic	gates	and	churning	through	algorithms,	but	entirely	 divorced	 from	 the	 physical	world.	 	 Landauer’s	 insight	was	 to	 see	 that	any	 string	of	 information	has	 to	have	a	physical	 embodiment,	whether	written	down	on	a	piece	of	paper,	stored	as	charges	on	the	gates	of	transistors	in	a	chip,	or	 held	within	 a	 human	mind.	 Thus	 even	 information	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 laws	 of	physics	(Parondo	et	al.	2015).	 	This	idea	led	to	the	resolution	of	the	paradox	of	Maxwell’s	 demon	 (reviewed	 in	 Leff	 and	 Rex	 2003),	 the	 imaginary	 intelligent	agent	that,	by	opening	and	closing	a	small	shutter	connecting	two	volumes,	could	sort	 out	 dissimilar	 molecules	 and	 apparently	 circumvent	 the	 second	 law	 of	thermodynamics,	 effortlessly	bringing	order	 and	decreasing	 the	 entropy	of	 the	Universe.	 	 But	 the	 demon	 performs	 an	 elementary	 computation	 to	 sort	 each	molecule,	 and	must	 use	 at	 least	 one	bit	 of	 storage	 in	 the	 process.	 	 Though	 the	computation	 can	 be	 carried	 out	 reversibly,	 the	 process	 of	 memory	 erasure	 is	irreversible.		Thus,	the	demon	either	accumulates	a	larger	and	larger	record	of	its	past	 computations	 (quickly	 exceeding	 its	 physical	 memory	 allocation,	 since	 it	would	need	an	Avogadro	number	of	bits	for	each	mole	of	gas	sorted)	or	it	resets	its	memory,	erasing	bits	and	causing	heat	dissipation	whose	net	result	precisely	cancels	any	entropy	reduced.		
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	In	my	view,	 such	an	approach	also	has	consequences	 for	 the	Laplacian	demon,	the	imaginary	agent	that	can	supposedly	view	a	physical	system	and	know	it	in	its	 entirety,	 without	 the	 tiresomely	 limited	 view	 afforded	 to	 an	 experimental	physicist.	 	 If	such	a	demon	were	(even	hypothetically)	to	be	constructed	 in	our	physical	world,	it	would	be	subject	to	physical	constraints	which	would	include	a	limit	 on	 the	 number	 of	 atoms	 it	 could	 contain,	 bounded	 from	 above	 by	 the	number	 of	 particles	 in	 the	 observable	 Universe	 (see	 also	 Lloyd	 2002).	 	 Hence	there	 is	 insufficient	 physical	 resource	 in	 the	 entire	 Universe	 to	 allow	 for	 the	operation	 of	 a	 Laplacian	 demon	 able	 to	 analyse	 even	 a	 relatively	 limited	macroscopic	physical	system.		I	suggest	that	these	physical	limits	of	knowability	affect	 not	 only	 physicists,	 but	 also	 philosophers.	 	 These	 physical	 limits	 also	provide	constraints	on	what	one	can	really	say	meaningfully	about	ontology,	the	nature	 of	 reality.	 	 The	 “view	 from	 nowhere”	 (Nagel	 1986)	 that	 appears	 to	 be	implicitly	 (and	 sometimes	 explicitly)	 championed	 by	 some	 philosophers	 is	inconsistent	 and	 entirely	untenable	 for	 observers,	 including	philosophers,	who	are	physically	embodied	in	the	Universe.				All	 of	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 reality	 is	 unimportant,	 but	 physicists	 and	philosophers	 alike	 perceive	 it	 and	 make	 statements	 about	 it	 on	 the	 basis	 of	limited	knowledge	and	partial	perception,	so	ontological	statements	always	have	an	 epistemological	 dimension.	 	 This	 is	 where	 emergent	 explanations	 or	narratives	are	ideal	because	they	make	a	snug	fit	with	the	manner	in	which	our	minds	are	constituted.			It	is	the	nature	of	these	emergent	explanations	that	I	will	now	consider.			
4.	Emergent	narratives		A	 narrative	 in	 a	 history	 or	 a	 novel	 charts	 a	 comprehensible	 path	 through	 a	morass	 of	 human	 complexity	 and	 interactions,	 helping	 the	 reader	 to	 focus	attention	 on	 key	 events	 and	 the	 links	 between	 them.	 	 Our	minds	 cannot	 cope	with	 the	 Laplacian-demon	 viewpoint	 of	 a	 human	 drama,	 knowing	 every	 single	event	and	character	in	excruciating	detail.	 	The	author	makes	choices,	and	their	skill	 often	 lies	 in	what	 to	 leave	out	 rather	 than	what	 is	 included.	The	 resulting	narrative	 provides	 enough	 structure	 to	 capture	 the	 essence	 of	 reality	 without	bogging	down	a	finite	mind	with	unnecessary	and	inconsequential	detail,	and	an	economy	of	style	and	expression	in	a	narrative	is	frequently	praised.		It	seems	to	me	that	emergent	theories	and	explanations	function	in	similarly	in	the	scientific	domain,	with	emergent	narratives	capturing	the	essence	of	reality	in	a	way	that	is	far	better	fitted	to	the	constraints	and	preferences	of	the	human	mind	that	a	brute	description	of	all	the	details	at	the	lowest	level.		My	intention	is	not	to	evaluate	to	what	extent	particular	examples	of	scientific	literature	display	characteristic	 features	 of	 narrative	 construction	 (as	 has	 been	 done	 elsewhere,	see	e.g.	Norris	et	al.	2005).	Neither	am	I	concerned	with	the	notion	of	"models	as	fiction"	which	alleges	that	by	employing	idealizations	and	abstractions	scientists	engage	 in	 a	 type	 of	 "make-believe	 when	 they	 use	 nonrealistic	 descriptions	 to	model	 phenomena"	 (this	 view	 is	 discussed	 in	Morrison	 2015,	 from	which	 this	
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quote	 is	 taken).	 	My	 purpose	 is	 different	 and	 rests	 on	 the	 assertion	 that	 any	scientific	discourse	that	aims	to	promote	understanding	has	a	narrative	essence	because	it	has	to	tell	a	story	of	complexity	to	a	finite	mind.		Condensed	matter	physics	provides	some	good	examples	of	 this.	 	For	example,	one	 strategy	 for	 coping	 with	 the	 challenge	 of	 ‘knowing’	 something	 about	macroscopic	systems	is	to	identify	the	right	quasiparticle.		As	a	simple	example,	consider	 a	 semiconductor,	 a	 material	 such	 as	 silicon,	 in	 which	 an	 energy	 gap	(known	as	 the	band	gap)	separates	 the	valence	band	and	the	conduction	band.		At	 absolute	 zero,	 the	 valence	 band	 is	 completely	 filled	with	 electrons	 and	 the	conduction	band	is	completely	empty.		As	the	temperature	increases,	it	becomes	possible	 to	 promote	 a	 few	 electrons	 from	 the	 valence	 band	 to	 the	 conduction	band,	 and	 these	 electrons	 become	 mobile	 in	 the	 conduction	 band	 and	 hence	conduct.		However,	in	the	valence	band	there	are	now	a	few	empty	states,	known	as	 holes,	 and	 these	 too	 can	 become	mobile.	 	What	 does	 that	mean?	 	When	 an	empty	 state	 (a	 hole)	moves	 one	 jump	 to	 the	 right,	 it	 is	 really	 an	 electron	 that	moves	one	jump	to	the	left.		But	the	concept	of	a	hole	is	useful	because	we	focus	on	 a	 few	 holes	 rather	 than	 the	 huge	 number	 of	 electrons.	 	 The	 hole	 has	 some	strange	properties	(such	as	having	a	negative	mass),	but	the	price	paid	 for	this	modest	 imaginative	 investment	 is	 outweighed	 by	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 ‘hole’	concept.	(In	much	the	same	way,	we	may	worry	about	a	bubble	rising	in	a	glass	of	beer	since	gravity	should	pull	 it	downwards,	but	of	course	the	heavier	liquid	flows	around	it	–	but	we	focus	naturally	on	the	rising	bubble	and	not	the	falling	liquid.)			Physics	is	replete	with	many	other	examples	of	these	emergent	phenomena.		For	example,	understanding	 the	 thermal	properties	of	 solids	 is	 accomplished	using	‘fictitious’	 quasiparticles	 called	 phonons,	 which	 are	 the	 vibrations	 of	 the	crystalline	 lattice	 whose	 energy	 is	 available	 in	 quantized	 lumps.	 	 These	 are	collective	modes	of	the	atoms	in	a	crystal,	but	they	behave	like	particles;	you	can	bounce	 neutrons	 off	 them	 and	 measure	 their	 energy-momentum	 relationship	(their	dispersion	relation),	just	like	any	other	particle.		They	behave	just	like	real	particles,	and	are	excitations	in	the	phonon	field	just	as	electrons	are	excitations	in	 the	 electron	 field.	 	 The	 same	 goes	 for	 magnons	 (quantized	 spin	 waves),	plasmons	 (quantized	 plasma	 waves)	 and	 a	 host	 of	 other	 examples	 (Anderson	1984),	all	of	which	qualify	as	emergent	particles	equipped	with	ontic	status,	each	being	 described	 by	 the	 same	 type	 of	 field	 theory	 as	 is	 used	 for	 ‘fundamental’	particles	such	as	electrons	and	photons.			In	each	of	the	examples	discussed	above,	a	classical	harmonic	mode	succumbs	to	‘second	quantization’	(the	quantum	mechanical	appearance	of	discrete	particle-like	structure	out	of	a	classical	wavelike	model)	giving	rise	to	emergent	particles,	but	 I	now	present	a	recent	example	where	 the	emergent	particles	have	a	quite	different	origin.	 	A	particular	magnetic	crystal,	Dy2Ti2O7,	has	a	crystal	structure	in	which	the	dysprosium	(Dy)	ions	are	arranged	in	a	network	of	corner-sharing	tetrahedra	(for	our	present	discussion,	we	can	forget	about	the	other	ions,	Ti	and	O).	Each	dysprosium	ion	sits	at	the	corner	joining	two	adjacent	tetrahedral.	The	dysprosium	 ions	are	magnetic	and	 the	crystal	 field	 (the	electrostatic	effects	on	neighbouring	ions	acting	on	the	magnetic	energy	levels)	constrains	the	magnetic	
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moment	(known	as	a	spin	 for	short)	of	each	dysprosium	ion	 to	point	along	 the	axis	 joining	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 two	 adjacent	 tetrahedra,	 out	 of	 one	 and	 into	 the	other	 (this	 results	 in	 classical	 Ising-like	 behaviour).	 	 When	 you	 include	 the	magnetic	 interactions	 between	 the	 dysprosium	 ions	 on	 the	 network	 of	tetrahedra,	you	 find	 that	 the	rule	of	 the	game	 is	now	that	 two	of	 the	spins	can	point	in	and	two	of	them	can	point	out.	It	doesn’t	matter	which	two	are	in,	and	which	two	are	out,	but	the	rule:	‘2-in,	2-out’	has	to	be	followed.	When	you	extend	this	 throughout	 the	 whole	 crystal,	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose	 which	 spins	 are	pointing	in	and	which	are	pointing	out	gives	an	additional	entropy	to	the	system	–	 a	 residual	 disorder	 which	 persists	 to	 low	 temperature	 –	 and	 this	 can	 be	measured	in	experiments.	 	 It	turns	out	that	the	statistical	mechanics	describing	this	situation	are	entirely	analogous	to	that	of	proton	disorder	in	(water)	ice,	and	so	this	compound	is	known	as	spin	ice	(Harris	et	al.	1997).		An	example	of	a	spin	ice	 configuration	 is	 shown	 in	 Figure	 4(a)	 for	 the	 simpler	 case	 of	 a	 two-dimensional	 lattice	 of	 corner-sharing	 squares.	 	 Here	 each	 spin	 belongs	 to	 two	squares	and	each	square	satisfies	the	‘2-in	2-out’	rule.		The	underlying	 ‘2-in	2-out’	 dictat	 (and	which	 is	 known	 in	 the	 trade	 as	 the	 ‘ice	rule’)	 results	 in	 a	 divergence-free	magnetization.	 It	 has	 now	 been	 appreciated	that	 this	 leads	 to	 the	 appearance	 of	 an	 emergent	 form	 of	 electromagnetism,	namely	 a	 description	 of	 the	 system	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 emergent	 gauge	 field	 that	reproduces	aspects	of	conventional	electromagnetism	that	supports	topological	excitations	(Castelnovo	et	al.	2008).		To	explain	what	this	means,	let	us	ask	what	happens	if	we	put	a	mistake	into	the	structure?	What	if	we	reverse	a	single	spin?	In	 this	 case,	 one	 of	 the	 tetrahedra	 will	 have	 ‘3-in	 1-out’	 (let’s	 call	 this	configuration	+)	and,	because	the	tetrahedra	are	corner	sharing,	a	neighbouring	tetrahedron	will	have	‘1-in	3-out’	(let’s	call	this	−).	This	situation	is	illustrated	for	the	two-dimensional	lattice	in	Figure	4(b).		The	key	insight	is	to	appreciate	that	this	second	tetrahedron	can	be	restored	to	its	ideal	‘2-in	2-out’	state	by	flipping	a	magnetic	moment	on	its	other	side.	What	this	does	is	to	shift	the	 ‘1-in	3-out’	configuration	along.	We	can	then	repeat	the	trick	and	shift	the	‘1-in	3-out’	configuration	further	away	from	the	‘3-in	1-out’,	so	that	 these	 two	 rule-breaking	 configurations	 can	 each	 move	 independently	through	 the	 spin	 ice	 (see	Figure	4(c)).	 	 Essentially	we	have	 ‘fractionalized’	 the	reverse	spin,	breaking	it	into	two	(the	+	and	-)	and	allowing	them	to	separate	and	go	their	own	way.		In	fact,	it	turns	out	that	the	separated	`halves’	of	the	magnetic	moment	 behave	 like	 individual	magnetic	 monopoles	 (Castelnovo	 et	 al.,	 2008).		(Note	 that	 Maxwell’s	 equation,	 div	 B=0,	 is	 not	 violated,	 as	 these	 monopoles	represent	particles	for	which	div	H≠0.)		Now	the	magnetic	monopoles	in	spin	ice	are,	at	root,	composed	of	 ‘nothing	but’	atomic	 magnetic	 moments,	 obeying	 Maxwell’s	 equations.	 However,	 the	 most	efficient	description	of	the	phenomenon	is	obtained	by	describing	the	system	in	terms	of	quasiparticles,	which	 in	 this	 case	are	magnetic	monopoles.	 	Hence	we	can	subtract	the	background	‘vacuum’	state	of	spins	away	from	the	problem	and	focus	only	on	the	monopoles.		This	is	a	radical	strategy	because	the	vacuum	here	is	a	very	rich	structure	of	spins	populating	the	lattice	in	a	divergence-free	(spin	ice)	configuration.		But	subtracting	it	away	gives	rise	to	a	dramatic	simplification	
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that	gets	to	the	heart	of	the	key	physics.		Thus	considering	the	physical	situation	with	 only	 the	 monopoles	 (Figure	 4(d))	 is	 far	 simpler	 than	 if	 our	 attention	 is	purely	 on	 the	 spins	 (Figure	 4(c),	 and	 imagine	 that	 diagram	 without	 the	monopoles	and	their	path	through	the	lattice	so	clearly	indicated).		But	 isn’t	 this	 just	 weak	 emergence?	 	 Are	 not	 scientists	 simply	 struggling	with	their	 imperfect	 models	 and	 wrestling	 with	 questions	 of	 epistemology,	 rather	than	addressing	reality	head	on?		I	reject	such	a	clear-cut	distinction.		Emergent	properties	are	members	of	the	set	of	elements	of	reality,	and	as	such	merit	ontic	status.	Moreover,	human	minds	have	fundamental	limits	imposed	on	them	by	the	physical	nature	of	the	universe,	and	though	we	(physicists	and	philosophers)	aim	at	 making	 firm	 statements	 about	 reality	 in	 order	 to	 construct	 a	 coherent	ontology,	our	viewpoint	is	from	within	that	universe,	not	from	outside	it,	and	is	consequently	 constrained.	 	 	 Even	 in	 thermodynamics	 (how	more	 real	 can	 you	get?)	our	fundamental	notion	of	entropy	is	one	that	depends	on	the	information	accessible	 to	 the	 experimenter	 and	 its	 limits	 (Jaynes	 1957).	 	 That	 limit	 of	 our	knowledge	 mandates	 that	 ontology	 can	 never	 be	 performed	 ‘in	 a	 vacuum’,	viewed	 ‘from	nowhere’	without	 some	measure	 of	 epistemology	 that	 takes	 into	account	our	own	participation	 in	 the	Universe.	 	Moreover,	not	 every	emergent	narrative	will	correctly	pick	out	a	set	of	elements	of	reality,	and	those	narratives	that	are	totally	misguided	or	even	very	slightly	flawed	have	to	be	weeded	out	or	adapted,	 however	 imperfectly,	 in	 a	 process	 driven	 by	 new	 experimental	 and	theoretical	developments.					My	approach	is	contrary	to	the	claim	that	“epistemological	emergence	does	not	have	 any	 obvious	 ontological	 implications;	 but	 ontological	 emergence	 does”	(Silberstein	 and	 McGeever	 1999).	 	 The	 emergent	 structures	 I	 have	 been	discussing	are	derivable	from	a	lower	level,	but	all	have	ontological	implications.		They	also	have,	as	discussed	above,	an	unavoidable	epistemological	component.	However,	 there	 are	 indeed	 distinctions	 that	 can	 be	 made	 between	 emergent	structures	 according	 to	 how	 easily	 derivable	 they	 are	 from	 lower	 level	descriptions	 (and	 could	 provide	 a	 continuum	 that	 one	 could	 label	 as	 ranging	from	 ‘weak’	 to	 ‘strong’).	 	 At	 one	 end	 of	 this	 spectrum	 there	 is	 the	 concept	 of	angular	 momentum:	 you	 might	 only	 need	 Newton’s	 laws	 when	 computing	 a	simulation	of	galaxy	formation	from	dust,	as	your	supercomputer	computes	the	forces	 and	 crunches	 the	 dynamical	 laws	 for	 a	 large	 number	 of	 gravitationally	attracting	 particles,	 but	 the	 emergence	 of	 angular	 momentum	 and	 its	conservation	 (inherent	 but	 not	 explicit	 in	 Newton’s	 laws)	 greatly	 simplify	 the	story	you	tell	of	why	the	galaxy	in	the	simulation	comes	out	to	be	a	spiral	shape.		Angular	momentum	as	an	emergent	property	(not	put	in	`by	hand’	at	the	start	or	immediately	obvious	from	staring	at	the	force	laws	or	equations	of	motion)	is	of	course	 reasonably	 easy	 to	 derive,	 but	 there	 are	 plenty	 in	many-body	quantum	mechanics	that	are	not,	and	so	may	be	located	further	out	on	the	spectrum.		But	all	these	emergent	structures	have	an	ontic	status	and	to	dismiss	them	as	merely	epistemic	devices	seems	to	miss	the	point.			
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5.	Conclusion		The	restrictions	of	 the	human	mind	 force	 the	 following	behaviour	 for	any	non-trivial	phenomenon:	scientists	select	a	bit	of	the	Universe	for	study,	and	decide	to	 focus	on	what	 they	discern	 to	be	 the	key	aspects,	naturally	 locating	 the	key	emergent	 properties.	 	 	 Following	 any	 understanding	 that	 they	 glean,	 a	 story	(explanation)	is	written.		The	best	storytellers	will	find	the	right	language	for	the	story	–	perhaps	a	mixture	of	words,	mathematics	and	pictures	–	and	the	search	for	 the	best	 story	 is	a	highly	non-trivial	process.	 	 Stories	can	be	pictorial,	 as	 in	Feynman	diagrams	(used	above	for	collisions	in	the	Life	universe	and	in	real	life	for	quantum	electrodynamics)	which	function	as	a	kind	of	comic	strip	narrative.	This	process	helps	those	of	us	`hearing’	the	story	to	`see’	the	point.	 	Because	of	human	 limitations,	 both	 in	 the	 tellers	 and	hearers,	 unnecessary	details	 are	 left	out	(and	that	involves	a	degree	of	choice	which	may	turn	out	to	be	judicious	or	foolhardy	 –	 in	 some	 situations	 there	 are	 principled	 reasons	 for	 ignoring	 the	details,	see	Berry	1994,	Batterman	2001).	Moreover,	an	emergent	explanation	is	not	 a	 simulation	 so	 will	 point	 to	 reality,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 in	 one-to-one	correspondence	with	it.	 	Crucially,	though	finite	an	emergent	story	can	speak	of	the	 infinite.	 	 Thus	 these	 emergent	 narratives	 are	 how	 in	 reality	we	 navigate	 a	complex	world.		I	would	like	to	acknowledge	useful	conversations	with	Bob	Batterman,	Katherine	Blundell,	 Harvey	 Brown,	 Alex	 Carruth,	 Lorenzo	 Greco,	 Tom	 Lancaster,	 Tim	O’Connor,	Mark	Pexton,	Wilson	Poon,	Simon	Saunders,	Christopher	Timpson	and	David	 Wallace	 and	 also	 to	 thank	 the	 Durham	 Emergence	 project	 for	 their	hospitality	at	their	summer	conferences,	during	which	some	of	these	ideas	were	developed.	
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	Figure	1:	The	Canada	goose	structure	in	the	game	of	Life	flies	diagonally	[shown	in	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 forty	 time-steps	 apart].	 (c)	 Changing	 one	 pixel	 in	 this	 structure	results	in	the	canada	goose	disintegrating	after	several	time-steps	[shown	in	(d)].		
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Figure	2:	The	collision	of	two	horizontally	travelling	spaceships	(with	speed	c/2).	Depending	on	the	initial	conditions,	this	can	lead	to	the	creation	of	two	‘gliders	travelling	diagonally	with	speed	c/4	(a,b),	total	annihilation	(d,e)	or	creation	of	a	structure	known	as	a	pulsar,	a	visually	attractive	period	3	oscillator	(g,h).	These	processes	 can	 be	 described	 succinctly	 using	 a	 Feynman-like	 diagram	 to	conceptualize	the	 interaction	(c,f,i).	(Here	 ‘s’	represents	a	spaceship,	 ‘g’	a	glider	and	‘P’	a	pulsar.)			
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Figure	3:	Processes	in	the	game	of	Life	can	be	viewed	at	a	 lower	level,	 iterating	the	 rules,	 or	 at	 a	 higher	 level,	 focussing	 on	 the	 emergent	 structures.	 A	 best	description	of	 the	process	 in	Figure	2(g,h,i)	 could	 stay	at	 the	higher	 level	until	something	 complicated	occurs	 (a	 collision),	when	attention	dips	down	 into	 the	lower	 level,	 before	 rising	 back	 to	 the	 higher	 level	 when	 simple	 behaviour	reappears.		
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	Figure	4:	(a)	The	spin	ice	problem	illustrated	on	a	two-dimensional	lattice	with	each	 square	 plaquette	 exhibiting	 the	 2-in,	 2-out	 arrangement	 of	 spins.	 (b)	Reversing	 a	 single	 spin	 results	 in	 two	 monopoles,	 which	 can	 (c)	 move	independently	(as	a	result	of	flipping	further	spins,	shown	in	dark	grey).	(d)	The	description	of	the	system	at	a	higher	(less	cluttered)	level	is	then	only	in	terms	of	the	monopoles	and	the	‘background’	spins	then	become	part	of	the	vacuum.			
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